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Uniform Rules of Engagement: The New
Tax Regime for Foreign Sales
BY HAROLD S. PECKRON *
Nine-tenths of the serious controversies which arise in life result
from misunderstandings; result from one man not knowing the facts
which to the other man seem important, or otherwise failing to
appreciate his point of view.
Justice Louis D. Brandeis'
Introduction
Justice Brandeis' comment aptly illustrates the area of foreign
trade concessions granted by one government to its corporate citizens
as interpreted by the world community. Misunderstandings and a
failure to appreciate the other country's point of view can lead to
disastrous consequences, indeed, even to war.
To reduce the likelihood of such occurrences, uniform rules of
engagement have been adopted much like the uniform rules of
engagement in military warfare. The latter rules presume consistent
treatment of combatants in an armed conflict as customarily
recognized in international law. It strengthens the moral claim of the
international community because it emphasizes their humanitarian
* Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law; J.D., Drake
University School of Law; LL.M., Georgetown University National Law Center;
M.B.A., Loyola University of Chicago; Ph.D., Southwest University. The author
gratefully acknowledges the support provided by the award of the Barry University
Research Grant, which enabled him to conduct this research.
1. See THE FORBES BOOK OF BusINEss QUOTATIONS 848 (Edward C. Goodman
& Ted Goodman eds., 1997).
2. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention No. I), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. See also Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as
Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (1987).
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underpinnings.3 The United States has codified the uniform rules of
engagement, as expressed in international agreements, which
recognize military principles of necessity, proportionality, and the
moral rule of mitigation of suffering.4 Thus, uniform rules of
engagement are the detailed instructions issued by military
authorities to specify binding limits on combat operations.5
So it is in the foreign trade arena. The World Trade
Organization (WTO), the successor to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), administers, enforces, and decides
international trade disputes by establishing uniform rules of trade
engagement designed to minimize trade wars through a moral rule of
mitigation of economic suffering by a member.6
Countries that fail to abide by the WTO uniform rules of trade
engagement can be taken to the WTO courts and face eventual
sanctioned retaliation.7  Without such rules, global economic
competition can become as fierce as the most devastating battle and,
as history has shown, can be the catalyst for a world war.8 Consider
that if last ditch trade negotiations being conducted by Japanese
envoys in Washington had succeeded, orders would have been sent to
Admiral Nagumo to return the invasion force heading toward
Hawaii Foreign trade, even today, results in brutal consequences to
trading partners who, to paraphrase Justice Brandeis, "fail to
appreciate the other person's (country's) point of view" and, thus, fail
3. Meron, supra note 2, at 350.
4. See U.S. Dept. of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare 6, Field Manual No.
27-10 (1956).
5. See, e.g., EDWARD LUTrWAK & STUART L. KOEHL, THE DICTIONARY OF
MODERN WAR 494 (1991). In modern times, rules of engagement have become an
inevitable aspect of all military operations. Given the potential political
consequences of any military action, and the prevalence of ambiguous situations in
the nuclear era, the tension between political control and military expediency will
likely remain unresolved. Id.
6. See The WTO in Brief, Part I, at http://www.wto.org (last visited Jan. 21,
2002).
7. See In Focus: WTO and Developing Countries, at http://www.foreignpolicy-
infocus.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2002).
8. The "silent embargo" on Japan during the Roosevelt administration froze all
of Tokyo's assets in the United States, requiring the Japanese to obtain a license for
any product deemed useful to their war machine and yet another license to unfreeze
the dollars to pay for it. This meant they had to go to both the State Department and
the Treasury Department, leaving ample room for maximum bureaucratic foot
dragging. See THOMAS FLEMING, THE NEW DEALERS' WAR: FDR AND THE WAR
WITHIN WORLD WAR II, at 18 (2001).
9. See WALTER LORD, DAY OF INFAMY 18 (1985).
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to respect the international uniform rules of trade engagement in
trade pacts administered by the WTO."
The purpose of this Article is to examine the recent foray of the
United States into the alleged disregard of the uniform trade rules
through the use of foreign sales corporations and how this latter tax
regime almost ignited an international trade war." To fully
comprehend the magnitude of this potential trade war, with its
significant political and tax consequences, the demise of foreign sales
corporations, its new substitute on the international tax stage, and the
concomitant policy implications will be examined. Before the death
knell for foreign sales corporations is heralded, however, a historical
perspective needs to be gained.
I. A Historical Perspective
A. International Tax Competition
The world of today is truly shrinking. Trade barriers are
evaporating, capital flows recognize no boundaries, and the Internet
makes worldwide communication a reality.12 Hence, isolationist
policies are somewhat anecdotal. This emerging global trade
environment creates a challenging tax atmosphere for countries
seeking to establish national tax policies based upon fairness and
neutrality while harmonization critics contend that "fairness" in tax
policy must be seen through an international prism. 3
10. See, e.g., United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations,"
WTO Doc. WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), available at http://wvv.wto.org (last
visited Dec. 1, 2001), reprinted in 2000 WTO DS LEXIS 7 [hereinafter Appellate
Panel Report]. Reports issued under the WTO's dispute settlement procedures are
available online at http://wvww.wto.org.
11. For an interesting topical description of this potential trade "war," see This
Tax Break Could Trigger a Trade War, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 4,2000, at 103.
12. See Jonathan Talisman, Challenges for Tax Policy in a Global Economy,
Remarks to the IRS/GW Annual Institute on Current Issues in International Taxation,
TAx NOTES TODAY, Dec. 11, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 TNT 238-70.
13. Harmonization of tax policy, like accounting standards, on an international
basis recognizes that little may be gained by sacrificing American tax policy
objectives of fairness and neutrality. Id at 2. See also DAVID SOLOMONS, MAKING
ACCOUNTING POLICY: THE QUEST FOR CREDIBILITY IN FINANCIAL REPORTING 62
(1986). Evident in this policy is the taxation of income earned by foreign
corporations outside the United States. Such income is generally taxed only if it is
"effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States" as provided under I.R.C. § 882(a). And the anti-deferral tax treatment, set
2001]
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This tension breeds tax competition. While the divas may sing
that "love makes the world go round," in reality it is capital that
makes the world turn on its axis, and there is no better means to
attract capital to one's shores than with a favorable tax policy. Tax
havens" are countries in the international community with tax
regimes designed to attract capital by allowing nonresident
individuals and corporations to receive preferential tax treatment on
their capital while ensuring their absolute secrecy from any
government. Such tax regimes violate the test of fairness in
international tax competition. As stated by the Treasury Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy:
There has been significant confusion regarding the distinction
between fair and unfair tax competition. This confusion has been
fueled by certain opponents of the OECD's harmful tax
competition initiative, who have mischaracterized the efforts as
attempts to establish high tax cartels and establish minimum levels
of taxation across the globe. Let me be clear: Countries are free to
choose the method and rate of taxation appropriate to fund their
public sectors. However, countries have gone beyond that right
when they have regimes that lack transparency, that are "ring
fenced" or shielded from their own economies and core tax base or
with respect to which there is no information exchange. Tax
systems with those features erode other countries' tax bases and
infringe on their ability to implement their own tax policy decisions.
Thus, the work at the OECD is limited to regimes with these
harmful features-lack of transparency, lack of information
exchange, or discrimination between residents and nonresidents-
in especially mobile sectors of the economy, and thus is narrowly
targeted at the problem of harmful tax competition.15
In light of this identification of an unfair international tax regime
forth at Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code, which imputes to the U.S. parent
corporation the non-repatriated income of its foreign subsidiary, posits yet another
basis for tax policy fairness and neutrality.
14. A tax haven is any country that has a low or zero rate of tax on all or certain
categories of income, and offers a certain amount of banking or commercial secrecy.
There are technically three forms of tax havens: countries that treat residents and
nonresidents alike by imposing a zero rate of tax on all income; countries that treat
nonresidents differently by imposing local income tax but no foreign tax on foreign
source income or profits; and countries that grant special privileges to nonresidents
by imposing a lower rate of tax. See HoYT L. BARBER, TAX HAVENS: HOW TO BANK,
INVEST, AND Do BUSINESS - OFFSHORE AND TAX FREE 4 (1992). See also JOSEPH
ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 3-7 (2000).
15. Talisman, supra note 12, at 2.
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as containing indicia of lack of transparency, lack of information
exchange, and discrimination between residents and nonresidents,
how did the United States foreign sales corporations reach this point
in world opinion? It was not the first time that the international
community found the United States practicing unfair international tax
competition. The first such attempt was the Domestic International
Sales Corporation (DISC).
B. Domestic International Sales Corporations (1971)
In the Revenue Act of 1971 a new tax regime was created,
known as the domestic international sales corporation or DISC.
16
Prior to this time, United States-based manufacturing companies
would establish foreign sales subsidiaries in zero or low tax countries
(tax havens) and substantially reduce their U.S. tax liability by
altering the price, cost, and ultimate profit allocations between the
United States-based manufacturing company and the foreign-based
sales subsidiary. To somewhat control these recalcitrant companies,
Congress passed Subpart F 7 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and
the Treasury enacted the I.R.C. § 482 regulations."
The gist of the Subpart F and § 482 regulations was, to many U.S.
corporations doing business oversees, worsening an already growing
unfavorable balance of trade. 9 This politically unpalatable outcome
of increasing trade deficits motivated Congress to enact the DISC
provisions. To become a "DISC," it was no longer permissible to
have a foreign sales subsidiary as every DISC had to be a U.S.
corporation included in the U.S. parent corporation's consolidated
tax return." DISC treatment was elective in nature2' and required its
16. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. V, 85 Stat. 497 (1971). The
DISC provision had been introduced earlier in the Trade Act of 1970 but was not
enacted. See H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
17. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 12(a), 76 Stat. 960 (1962).
18. T.D. 6952, 1968-1 C.B. 218.
19. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., PROPOSAL
OFTHE U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT (Comm. Print 1970).
20. See I.R.C. § 992. Despite the fact that DISCs became inoperative in 1984, the
DISC provisions in the 1954 Code were carried over to the 1986 Code as cited
hereunder. This was an ingenious "back door" approach to ensuring that the
Treasury and its IRS would have access to the books and records of DISCs, and that
the DISCs would adopt U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. See Edwin S.
Cohen & Michael D. Hankin, A Decade of DISC: Genesis and Analysis, 2 VA. TAX
REv. 7 (1982).
21. All code section references hereunder are to the Internal Revenue Code of
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
income to be export generated*2 Any "qualified" export property
(e.g. products) had to be produced in compliance with a 50%
domestic content rule,' thereby ensuring no migration of U.S. jobs.
The purpose of this new tax regime was to allow the United
States-based DISC to receive tax deferral24 (not forgiveness) on its
export earnings. The U.S. parent corporation would be subject to tax
on the DISC earnings,' on a consolidated basis,26 albeit foreign tax
credits would prevent any double taxation. The schema for profit
allocation between the DISC and its parent substantially lessened the
complexity of the Section 482 regulations.27 Ultimately, the buy back
of foreign sales corporations by allowing tax deferral of U.S. based
sales corporations did improve the balance of trade.' And such was
its Achilles heel.
The world community branded the DISC provisions as naked
trade exploitation, granting a prohibited export subsidy to U.S.
companies in violation of the uniform rules of trade engagements
pursuant to GATI'.29
Belgium, France and The Netherlands commenced a GATT
proceeding positing that the export subsidy granted under the DISC
provisions resulted in bilevel pricing," i.e., export prices lower than
domestic prices causing immediate harm to trading partners.3 The
United States contended, inter alia, that the complaining parties
offered their exporters dividend income exemptions received from
1986. See I.R.C. § 992.
22. Id.
23. I.R.C. § 993.
24. I.R.C. § 991.
25. I.R.C. § 995.
26. This includes any deemed dividend payments. Id.
27. Companies could opt for one of three transfer pricing methods to allocate
profits. To wit:
1. Section 482 pricing and the regulations thereunder;
2. Proportional (50/50) allocation of the combined taxable income; or
3. Nonproportional (4/96) allocation of the DISC's gross receipts from
export transactions and the U.S. parent, respectively.
See I.R.C. § 994.
28. See John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC
Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1978).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The European Economic Community (later the European Union) supported
the countries attacking the DISC regime as unfair tax competition characterized as
an export subsidy. Id.
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foreign subsidiaries.32
Simultaneous with the GATT hearings on this matter, the Tokyo
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations were being conducted
wherein an addendum to the Subsidies Code (Article XVI(4))
characterized a subsidy as "the full or partial exemption, remission, or
deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare
charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises."33
Shortly thereafter, the GATT Council adopted the conclusions of
GATT investigative panels which had heard the cases and
determined that the tax systems of the United States, France,
Belgium and The Netherlands had unfairly violated the uniform trade
rules set forth under GATT' Since adoption was precluded without
the unanimous consent of the contracting parties, final adoption was
delayed until 1981 at which time the GATT Council promulgated the
following ruling with all parties in agreement (known as the
"Understanding"):
The Council adopts these reports on the understanding with respect
to these cases, and in general, economic processes (including
transactions involving exported goods) located outside the
territorial limits of the exporting country need not be subject to
taxation by the exporting country and should not be regarded as
export activities in terms of Article XVI: 4 of the General
Agreement. It is further understood that Article XVI: 4 requires
that arms-length pricing be observed, i.e., prices for goods in
transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under
their or the same control should for tax purposes be the prices which
would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arms-
length. Furthermore, Article XVI: 4 does not prohibit the adoption
of measures to avoid double taxation of foreign source income."
32. See Tax Legislation Cases: Income Tax Practices Maintained by France, Nov.
12,1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 121 (1977); Income Tax Practices Maintained
by Belgium, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 132-33 (1977); Income Tax
Practices Maintained by The Netherlands, Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.)
at 142-43 (1977).
33. GATT Subsidies Code Annex para. (e). See GATT Doc. No. MTN/NTMIW
236 (1979).
34. See United States Tax Legislation Case (DISC), Nov. 12, 1976, GATT"
B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 98, 112-14 (1977); Income Tax Practices Maintained by
France, at 114, 125-27; Income Tax Practices Maintained by Belgium, at 127, 134-36;
Income Tax Practices Maintained by The Netherlands, at 137, 145-47.
35. See DISCs: US-Europe Tax Pact Finally Accepted by GATT Council, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA), at 1 (Dec. 9, 1981) [hereinafter Tax Pact] (emphasis added).
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
As a result of the 1981 Understanding, the United States needed
a new tax regime for income earned in foreign countries by its
residents. The Reagan administration's trade policy initiatives did
not include "patching" the DISC provisions, which would have
exacerbated a bad situation by making it worse. 6 Such a policy could
have served to further alienate existing trading partners. So, an
entirely fresh approach in tax policy was needed to conform to the
political realities of the approaching mid-1980s. That reality became
Foreign Sales Corporations.
C. Foreign Sales Corporations (1984)
The problem for the Treasury and Congress was to design a tax
regime that did not run afoul of the world community by creating an
illegal export tax subsidy for U.S. corporations. Despite American
denials, the GATT Council had found U.S. policy to be such a
violation of GATT rules,37 making the tax deferral mechanisms of
DISCs a less than reliable approach.
As any good architect, the Treasury designed a plan using the
actual GATT Council's unanimous understanding of the five parties,"
which led it to suggest to Congress the tax regime known as foreign
sales corporation (FSC). Adopted by Congress in the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984,"9 FSCs were designed to mitigate the debilities
associated with DISCs. In a nutshell, FSCs scrap the tax deferral
mechanism of DISCs for one of tax exemption, adopting a territorial
application4 set forth in the understanding."
The primary distinction of the FSC versus DISC derived from
the Understanding, which mandated that income be earned extra-
territorially.42 Hence FSCs had to be foreign corporations subject to a
foreign management process43 unlike DISCs, which were domestic
36. See Jackson, supra note 28, at 779.
37. See supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 801(a), 98 Stat. 494, 985-
1003 (1984). The DISC provisions were not repealed by the 1984 Act and the
Treasury provided specific transition rules for DISCs and FSCs. See T.D. 7983, 1984-
2 C.B. 151.
40. This territorial exclusion tax principle has been used in § 911 where a limited
exclusion of foreign income is provided U.S. citizens in foreign countries. See I.R.C.
§ 911(a).
41. See Tax Pact, supra note 35.
42. Id.
43. See I.R.C. § 924(c).
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corporations that had no tangible foreign nexus other than being a
collection of foreign sales.' As described by the Treasury
Department,4 5 the differences between the FSC and DISC tax regimes
are as follows:
A DISC is a domestic corporation which is not itself taxable while a
FSC must be created or organized under the laws of a jurisdiction
which is outside of the United States (including certain U.S.
possessions) and may be taxable on its income except for its exempt
foreign trade income. The DISC provisions enable a shareholder
to obtain a partial deferral of tax on income from export sales and
certain services, if 95 % of its receipts and assets are export related.
The FSC provisions contain no assets test, but a portion of income
for export sales and certain services is exempt from U.S. taxes if the
FSC satisfies certain foreign presence, foreign management, and
foreign economic processes tests.46
Through the FSC device, the Treasury developed a taxing regime
that walked the narrow gangplank between the GATT rules and the
Understanding on the one hand, and the unfair international tax
regime of tax haven creation on the other.47
To facilitate the latter, FSCs could be incorporated only in those
foreign countries that complied with a free exchange of tax
information.'
For a foreign corporation to qualify as an FSC, eight general
statutory requirements4' must be met. The eight conjunctive
44. See supra note 20.
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.921-2(c), Q&A 6.
46. Id.
47. See I.R.C. §§ 922, 927 (e)(3).
48. Not all jurisdictions in the European Economic Community initially qualified,
albeit some did create special tax incentives to entice their establishment. See, e.g.,
Symposium on Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in Transnational Litigation, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 957 (1984); Liebman, Update on FSCs, With Particular
Emphasis On the Use Of European Jurisdictions, 67 TAXES 555 (1989).
49. See I.R.C. § 922(a). These eight general statutory requirements contain, in
actuality, ten specific threshold requirements for qualification as set forth at the
Treasury Regulations. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.921-2(a), 1.922-1(a).
In addition, three exemptions are evident in the FSC tax regime. First is the
exempt treatment of foreign trade income of the FSC as being not effectively
connected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business as required under I.R.C. §
882(a). Second is the exemption of Subpart F income earned by the FSC and not
repatriated or distributed to the U.S. parent corporation. Last is the exemption of
the FSC's foreign trade income distributed to the U.S. parent corporation as a
dividend by allowing for a 100% dividends-received deduction.
2001]
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requirements are set forth at § 922(a):
1. The FSC ' must be a corporation, other than an insurance
company, organized and recognized in a qualifying country or a
U.S. possession51 other than Puerto Rico;52
2. An FSC is limited to twenty-five shareholders. 3 This is defined
as an individual,'4 corporate 5 or other 6 shareholder;
3. A blanket prohibition against the issuance of any preferred
equity either outstanding or at any time.7 This prohibition does
not deny the FSC from issuing more than one class of common
50. There are technically four types of FSCs: regular FSC (recommended for
foreign corporations with annual export sales beyond $1 million because of the
organization and maintenance costs); shared FSC (recommended for foreign
corporations that wish to share the costs-and benefits-with up to twenty-five total
exporters); small FSC (statutorily defined as a foreign sales corporation with exempt
foreign trade income from foreign trading gross receipts of $5 million or less in the
taxable year as provided under § 924(b)(2)(B)(i)); and shared small FSCs (similar to
the shared FSC only with the five million or less limitation up to twenty-five total
exporters). See I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.922-1(c).
51. I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).
52. Puerto Rico is excluded from the four eligible U.S. possessions (American
Samoa, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands
of the United States) but its products may be exported by using an FSC. See I.R.C. §
927(d)(3)(1986); Treas. Regs. § 1.922-1(d), (e), Q&A 5; see also I.R. Notice 84-15,
1984-2 C.B. 474 (providing the original list of twenty-five countries approved for FSC
qualification purposes).
53. I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(B).
54. Treas. Reg. §1.922-1(f). Joint owners are counted individually. Thus, a
husband and wife jointly owning the stock of one FSC would be treated as two
shareholders toward the twenty-five shareholders rule. See Treas. Reg. § 1.922-1(f),
Q&A 6(i).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.922-1(f).
56. "Other" shareholders is generally interpreted to mean flow through entities,
e.g., estates, trusts and partnerships (S corporations are specifically denied ownership
in wholly-owned foreign entities as a qualified Subchapter S subsidiary must meet the
general qualifications of S corporations denying it FSC status (as it did for DISCs).
See I.R.C. §§ 1362(b)(2), 1361(b)(3)(B)). However, assuming arguendo, that an S
corporation owned some ownership in an FSC, it would not receive the dividends-
received deduction making the tax exempt FSC earnings taxable upon distribution.
An estate is treated as a single shareholder pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.922-1(f).
A trust, on the other hand, is not treated as a shareholder, unless it is a grantor trust
under I.R.C. §§ 671-679, in which case each grantor is treated as a shareholder; in
non-grantor trusts the beneficiaries are treated as individual shareholders. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.922-1(f), Q&A 6(iv). Each partner (general or limited) is treated as an
individual shareholder similar to the trust treatment of its grantors or beneficiaries.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.922-1(f), Q&A 6(v).
57. I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(C).
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equity58 unless such issuance is the intentional avoidance of
federal income tax, e.g., directing dividends to shareholders with
net operating loss carryovers; 9
4. The FSC must maintain its office, again within the concept of the
foreign management process, within a qualifying jurisdiction,8
albeit such office need not be within the qualifying country of
incorporation;61
5. To ensure the "foreign management process," at least one
member of the FSC Board of Directors must be a nonresident of
the United States, citizen or not;62
6. The FSC must maintain its books and records at both its foreign
office and in the United States.6  "Books and records" is
interpreted by the Treasury Department in the broadest possible
sense including the FSC's financials, invoices, statements of
account, etc.6
7. If a controlled group of corporations6 contain a regular FSC,
then a DISC or "small" FSC is expressly excluded from such
group.66 A "small" FSC is any regular FSC with exempt foreign
trade income from foreign trading gross receipts of $5 million or
less in the taxable year as provided under § 924(b)(2)(B)(i); and
8. The FSC is only an FSC if a valid election is made by the foreign
corporation in a timely fashion.67 Timely fashion generally
means ninety days prior to the beginning of the foreign
corporation's taxable year.6
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.922-1(g).
59. Id. at Q&A 8.
60. I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(D)(i).
61. See Treas. Reg. §1.922-1(h), Q&A 11.
62. I.R.C. § 922 (a)(1)(E)(1986). See also Treas. Reg. §1.922-1(j).
63. I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(D)(ii).
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.922-1(i), Q&A 12(i), (ii). See also Rev. Rul. 71-20, 1971-1
C.B. 392 (discussing acceptable forms of business records, e.g., electronic versus hard
copy form).
65. "Controlled group of corporations" means the same as under the affiliated
definition of I.R.C. § 1563(a) except that the operative percentage of control is
reduced to more than 50% from less than 80%. See IRC § 927(d)(4)(1986).
66. I.R.C. § 922(a)(1)(F). Compare Treas. Reg. §1.927(f)-l(a), Q&A 8 with
Treas. Reg. § 1.924(a)-1T(j)(2) (stating that the existence of several small FSCs in a
controlled group of corporations is permissible provided that the five million
limitation is allocated among such small FSCs).
67. I.R.C. § 922(a)(2). See I.R.C. § 927(f) (discussing election of either a regular
FSC or a small FSC).
68. I.R.C. § 927(f). But if the foreign corporation is electing FSC status in its
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Once the foreign corporation meets the conjunctive
requirements of § 922 and is treated as an FSC, it must qualify the
export sales for FSC purposes under the foreign management and
economic process requirements. 9 As with the requirements to qualify
the foreign corporation as an FSC, the foreign management process7°
and foreign economic process7' are statutory conjunctive
requirements that render the tax benefit of FSC treatment to
qualified export sales by the FSC.
To satisfy the foreign management process requirement, three
criteria must be met. First, any formal meetings of the FSC's board or
shareholders must be outside the United States.2  Second, the
principal bank account of the FSC must be maintained in a qualifying
country.73 Finally, all dividend, legal, accounting and administrative
disbursements must be from the principal bank account.74
In conjunction with the foreign management process, the FSC
must meet the foreign economic process requirements5 consisting of
two tests. One test deals with sales participation activities76 and the
other test focuses on foreign direct cost activities.7  Sales
participation activities ensure that non-advertising solicitation and
contract negotiation relate to a qualified transaction for generating
foreign trading gross receipts." Direct cost activities, set forth at §
924(e), include advertising and sales promotion, processing of orders
and delivery, transportation, statement of account and receipt of
inaugural (first) year, then the ninety day window is opened wider to include ninety
days after the beginning of its taxable year. See Treas. Reg. § 1.921-1T(b)(1), (2).
69. I.R.C. § 924(b)(1).
70. I.R.C. § 924(b)(1)(A).
71. I.R.C. § 924(b), (c), (d).
72. I.R.C. § 924(c)(1). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.924 (c)-1(b).
73. I.R.C. § 924 (c)(2). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.924(c)-1(c)(1). While a demand
deposit (checking) account need be maintained, the regulations do not require that it
be a negotiable order of withdrawal account or contain a specified balance. Thus, a
non-interest bearing minimum or low balance demand deposit account satisfies this
requirement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.924(c)-1(c)(1).
74. I.R.C. § 924(c)(3). No prohibitions exist on more frequent disbursements to
minimize any foreign interest on the principal bank account and its adverse
concomitant tax consequence. See Treas. Reg. § 1.924 (c)-1(d)(1).
75. See I.R.C. § 924(b), (c), (d).
76. I.R.C. § 924(d)(1)(A). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.924(d)-1(c)(1).
77. I.R.C. § 924(d)(1)(B), (d)(2).
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.924(d)-1(c)(1).
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payment, and credit risk assumption.'9  Once identified, then the
foreign direct cost activity test is met if either 50% of all these costs
are foreign or 85% of any two of the five cost activities are foreign.0
One must ask why a U.S. corporation would consider
establishing an FSC in a foreign jurisdiction given the rather onerous
qualification and export sales requirements. In a nutshell, the
earnings of the FSC can be partially exempt from U. S. tax and most,
if not all, dividends distributed to the U.S. parent corporation from
the FSC qualify for a 100% dividends-received deduction.81 Thus,
FSCs operate as a partial exemption from U.S. tax for U.S. parent
corporations on the foreign trading gross receipts, thereby shielding
its export profits and promoting export sales.
To better understand the true nature of this exemption, the
transfer pricing rules need to be addressed. A transfer price is the
price charged by one segment of a company to another segment."
There are three generally accepted transfer pricing methods: cost,'
market 4 and negotiated.' The most popular pricing method86 is
market-based transfer prices because it allows for a profit
determination by the transferor entity and facilitates a decentralized
form of organizational structure.f Nevertheless, the objectives
inherent in transfer pricing at the multinational level are significantly
different from their domestic counterpart. Domestic objectives
include greater divisional autonomy and motivation for managers,
coupled with stronger goal congruence.' International transfer
pricing objectives focus almost entirely on tax minimization policies
with consideration for foreign exchange risks and stronger
79. I.R.C. § 924(e).
80. See I.R.C. § 924(d)(1)(B), (d)(2). See also F. Jan Carnevale & Robert S.
Giusti, FSC Regulations: Qualifying Transactions, Foreign Presence, Foreign
Management and Foreign Economic Process Requirements, 16 TAX MGM'T INT'L J.
175 (1987).
81. I.R.C. §§ 921,925.
82. See generally, Ralph L. Benke & James D. Edwards, Transfer Pricing
Techniques and Uses, 61 Mgmt. Acct. 2,44-46 (1980).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. For an excellent survey of pricing methods by industrial companies, see Tang,
Transfer Pricing in the 1990s, 73 Mgmt. Acct. 22, 25 (1992).
87. See FORBES, supra note 1.
88. A. Aldsllah, Guidelines for CEOs in Transfer Pricing Policies, 70 Mgmt. Acct.
3, 61 (1988).
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competitive market positions.Y
The transfer pricing rules for FSCs, unlike DISCs, allow for less
income to be allocated,' primarily because of the FSC exemption and
the dividends-received deduction tax regime. Under the DISC
provision, § 482 allowed the Treasury Department to allocate prices
and income between the DISC and its parent corporation.9' The FSC
tax regime allows for either § 482 allocations of income by the
Treasury Department or a formulaic approach known as the
administrative pricing rules.2
In the case of a sale of export property to an FSC by a related
supplier, income is to be allocated to FSCs under one of three
methods. One of these methods uses the prices actually charged
between the FSC and the "related supplier" (i.e., the United States
parent), subject to the standard United States transfer pricing rules in
§ 482. The other two methods are "administrative pricing" rules,
under which FSCs and their parents are allowed to apply for the
allocation of income between them.93
The first administrative pricing rule apportions 23% of the total
combined taxable income (that is, net income earned by the related
supplier and the FSC together) derived from the sale of export
property by the FSC and the remaining 77% to its related supplier.
This rule further provides that 15/23 (approximately 65%) of the
FSC's foreign trade income is exempt from U.S. tax.94 Thus, this rule
provides an exemption for 15% (23% x 15/23) of the total combined
taxable income earned in the transaction.
The second administrative pricing rule allows the FSC to take
1.83% of the total foreign trading gross receipts from the sale of
export property as foreign trade income, not to exceed twice the
amount allocable to the FSC under the combined taxable income
method, i.e., 46% of the total combined (net) income earned in FSC
transactions.95 This rule further provides that 15/23 (approximately
65%) of the FSC's foreign trade income is exempt from U.S. tax.
Thus, this rule provides an exemption for up to 30% (46% x 15/23) of
89. Id.
90. The combined taxable income and gross receipts allocated to the FSC are
only 23% and 1.83%, respectively. Compare I.R.C. § 994 with I.R.C. § 925.
91. I.R.C. § 994.
92. See I.R.C. §§ 921,925.
93. I.R.C. § 925(a)(1), (a)(2), (c).
94. I.R.C. §§ 923(a)(3), 921(a)(4).
95. I.R.C. § 925(d).
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the total combined taxable income earned in the transaction. This
30% exemption is only available, however, in limited circumstances.
Because the ceiling for the gross receipts method is linked to the
combined taxable (net) income method, it is not mathematically
possible to receive the full 30% exemption unless the profit margin
on a transaction is 4% or less. At a profit margin of 8% or more, the
exemption amount under the gross receipts method will be no more
than 15% under any circumstances.96 The following table summarizes
these pricing rules:
Target Pricing Rule
I.R.C. § 482
Administrative
I.R.C. § 923(a)(3)
Administrative
I.R.C. § 925(d)
Allocation Standard
Arms length market price (30%
FTI exempt).
23% CTI to FSC/77% to
related supplier.
65.22% FTI exempt for a total
exemption of 15% CTI.
1.83% FTGR, limited twice by
the I.R.C.
§ 923(a)(3) standard, i.e., up to
46% CTI.
This standard allows 46% of the
65% FTI exemption or a
maximum exemption of 30%
CTI in limited circumstances
(see above).
The following example illustrates how economically
advantageous the FSC tax regime can be to a U.S. corporation:
A United States-based manufacturing company establishes an FSC
pursuant to § 922 in a qualified jurisdiction. It then, as a related
supplier, sells its products to the FSC which resells, via a paper trail,
to buyers abroad. The FSC, in the alternative, could be a mere
agent of the U.S. corporation receiving a commission on the sales.
In either case, the goods are produced and shipped directly from
96. See United States - Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WTO
Doe. WT/DS108IR, at 2-3 (Oct. 8, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited
Dec. 1, 2001), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 173 (2000) [hereinafter Panel Report].
Method
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the U.S. based manufacturer to the foreign buyer. The U.S. parent
corporation realizes a foreign profit of $7,000,000, and under the
administrative pricing rules (method II above) allocates 23% to the
FSC or $1,610,000, resulting in a tax exemption of 15/23 or 65% of
the foreign taxable income or a total exemption of 15%. Thus, of
the $7,000,000 in combined taxable income, only $5,950,000 is
taxable. To wit:
U.S. Parent FSC Total
CTI $7,000,000 --- $7,000,000
Method II
Allocation
23% CTI <$1,610,000> $1,610,000
Tax Exemption:
15/23 (65.22%)
or 15% CTI --- <$1,050,000> <$1,050,000>
TI $5,390,000 $560,000 $5,950,000
Thus, if we assume a 40% Federal tax rate and a 5% State tax rate,
the blended tax rate of 45% results in an FSC tax benefit (cash
savings) of $472,500 (1,050,000 x .45). And distribution by the FSC
of the exempt earnings qualifies for the 100% dividends-received
deduction,97 resulting in no tax on such earnings to the U.S. parent.
So the use of the FSC tax regime, and its income allocation rules
for target pricing, can negate the use of the § 482 market value (arms-
length) rules.98 And since the objective in the selection of an income
allocation method is to allocate the largest amount of income to the
FSC in order to maximize its tax exemption, generally the
administrative pricing regime achieves this purpose." With such
97. I.R.C. § 921(d). Such income is taxed as effectively connected United States-
source income and comes first from qualified foreign trade income. See I.R.C. §
926(a).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.925(a)-1T(a)(1).
99. The administrative pricing rules allow an exclusion of 15/23 of the foreign
trade income (16/23 if the shareholders of the FSC are individuals, which is unlikely
considering that no dividends-received deduction is available to them resulting in the
taxation of the distributed exempt earnings of the FSC). In contrast, § 482 only
permits an exclusion of 30% of the foreign trade income (32% in the case of
individual shareholders). Thus, as a U.S. corporation with an FSC, it is possible to
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admitted economic tax advantages to U.S. corporations, FSCs
flourished, attracting the attention of the world trading community.' °
H. Demise of the FSC
A. Evolution of the World Trade Organization
During the turbulent period of the 1990s, with unfavorable trade
balances for the United States,'' the world community radically
altered the international trade organizational structure. At the 1986-
1994 GATT Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) was born."
Designed to administer trade agreements, act as a forum for
trade negotiations and review national trade policies, its dispute
settlement authority is, perhaps, the most significant development.03
Built upon the GATT Dispute Settlement System,"° the WTO
Dispute Settlement System is far more structured with timetables and
specific procedures. While the system resembles a tribunal, its
mission is to promote conciliation and consultation between or
among the member nations.' 6 An even more significant development
exclude from the FSC's income 15/23 or 65% of the foreign trade income and, upon
distribution, pay no tax upon receipt because of the dividends-received deduction.
See IRC § 923(a)(3), (a)(2); Treas. Reg. §1.923-IT(b)(1); see also table in text above.
100. According to the WTO report, there were over 6,000 FSCs in 1999 and the
estimated total export stimulus, created by FSCs amounted to $20 billion. See Panel
Report, supra note 96, at 45-46.
101. For instance, in 1996 there was an unfavorable balance of trade of
approximately $191 billion, yet of that number, the United States had a favorable
balance in its exporting of services by $80 billion. See CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL &
STANLEY L. BRUE, ECONoMics 764-65 (14th ed. 1999).
102. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INsTRUMENTs-REsuLTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994).
103. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World
Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since
1948,31 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1157 (1994).
104. Id. at 1195.
105. For more information on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, see Settling
Disputes: The WTO's Most Individual Contribution, at
http://www.wto.orglenglishlthewto e/whatis.eltife/dispOCe.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2001). The entire Dispute Settlement Procedure takes approximately one year-
fifteen months if the dispute is appealed. Id.
106. If consultations fail, a "panel" established by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) launches into an examination, via an expert review group, culminating in a
panel report issued to the parties. Approximately nine months after the panel's
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is that the WTO rules prevented countries from being able to block
adverse panel and appellate reports through a lack of unanimity (as
was the case under the GATT procedure)."°
B. WTO Panel Report
Still smarting from trade dispute defeats under the trade rules,"
European Union (EU) member states seized upon the new WTO
procedures to challenge the FSC tax regime.
After mandated consultations failed," the EU countries and the
challenged party, the United States, argued before the dispute
settlement panel of the WTO. The EU claimed, inter alia, that there
were two significant problems with the FSC tax regime: the FSC was a
prohibited export subsidy1 ' and the administrative pricing rules
violated the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(ASCM).1'
establishment, the report is circulated to the DSB and, if the parties desire, an
appellate review of the panel report is granted. This review is not de novo but must
raise specific points of law. Such appellate review is generally completed within
thirty days resulting in an appellate report to the parties and the DSB. Consequently,
the DSB has the power to accept or reject the appellate report with the latter
requiring a consensus of the DSB-a rare occurrence. Once the panel/appellate
report has been adopted, the arduous process of implementation commences with the
losing party filing a proposed implementation report within a reasonable period of
time. See Settling Disputes, supra note 105.
107. Richard 0. Cunningham & Clint N. Smith, Section 301 and Dispute Settlement
in the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 581 (Terrence P. Stewart Ed., 1996).
108. See, e.g., EC Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Report of the Panel, WTO Doe. WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997), available at
http://www.wto.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
109. The initial challenge by the EU (the EU comprises Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; Canada and Japan
made third-party submissions in support of the EU position.) was on November 18,
1997, seeking consultation with the United States on I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (FSCs). Such
consultations failed, so on July 1, 1998, the EU requested that a panel be established.
On September 22, 1998, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body appointed a panel
wherein the original contentions and arguments were made. See Panel Report, supra
note 96, at 1.
110. Id. at 49-51.
111. See Agreement on Agriculture & Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (ASCM), April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 6, 39,
264, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 126 (1994); see Panel Report, supra note 96, at 41-46.
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The EU countries argued that the FSC scheme was a subsidy,"'
or more specifically, that the FSC tax regime created two subsidies.
To wit:
The first is the tax exemptions comprised in the FSC scheme. These
are essentially:
* The exclusion of the "foreign trade income" of FSCs from the
controlled foreign corporations provisions of Subpart F of the
IRC (Sections 951(e) and 954(d) and (e) IRC);
* The exemption from U.S. tax which would otherwise be due on
the "exempt foreign trade income" of the FSC (Section 921(a)
IRC).
* The fact that the parent of the FSC is accorded a 100 %
dividends received deduction (i.e., exemption from U.S. tax)
for the dividends received from the FSC from "earnings or
profits attributable to foreign trade income" (Section 245 (c)
IRC in conjunction with Section 926 (a)).
These exclusions, exemptions and deductions (hereafter referred to
as the "tax exemptions") complement each other and lead, as they
are intended to lead, to less tax being paid than would be the case if
the FSC scheme did not exist (or rather if it did not contain the tax
exemptions).
The tax exemptions by themselves would be of relatively little
economic significance if they were not compounded by the
existence of the second of the subsidies which the European
Communities identifies and objects to. That is availability for the
calculation of the exempt foreign trade income of FSCs of special
administrative pricing rules which derogate from the transfer
pricing rules which would otherwise apply. These increase the non-
taxed profits of FSCs and reduce the taxed profits of the parent
companies and consequently decrease the tax burden on exports
effected under the FSC scheme.
The European Communities makes this distinction between two
aspects of the FSC scheme because each would exist in the absence
of the other and it is important that both be held to be prohibited
subsidies so that both will have to be withdrawn.1
3
Of critical impact to this argument is the bare violation of Article
112. See Panel Report supra note 96, at 47.
113. Id. at 47-48.
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1 (item (e) of Annex I) of the ASCM, particularly footnote 59:
The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export
subsidy where, for example, appropriate interest charges are
collected. The Members reaffirm the principle that prices for goods
in transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers
under their or under the same control should for tax purposes be
the prices which would be charged between independent
enterprises acting at arm's length. Any Member may draw the
attention of another Member to administrative or other practices
which may contravene this principle and which result in a
significant saving of direct taxes in export transactions. In such
circumstances the Members shall normally attempt to resolve their
differences using the facilities of existing bilateral tax treaties or
other specific international mechanisms, without prejudice to the
rights and obligations of Members under GATT 1994, including the
right of consultation created in the preceding sentence.
Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member from taking
measures to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income
earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another Member.1
4
The EU application of this trade rule to the FSC tax regime was
clear. It disputed the special administrative pricing rules as being
permissible under footnote 59 as well:
As explained above, the FSC scheme exempts part of the FSCs
foreign trade income from United States tax, and exempts the
dividends arising out of that income from tax in the hands of the
parent. The subsidy arising out of the application of the special
administrative pricing rules increases the exemption and is thus in
itself also an exemption. In addition the fact that this is to be
considered an exemption (or perhaps a remission) of direct taxes is
confirmed by footnote 59 to item (e) which states that "the
Members reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in transactions
between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or
under the same control should for tax purposes be the prices which
would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm's
length." As explained, the FSC special administrative rules do not
comply with the arms length principle and are a derogation from it
designed to shift profits from export sales into a tax exemption.
Both the tax exemptions per se and the special administrative rules
are "specifically related to exports" since they are conditional upon
114. Id. at 280.
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exportation of United States goods and limited in scope to the
extent of such exportation."5
Faced with a statutory conundrum, the United States contended
in its arguments that the issues were not so narrowly drawn as the EU
described . 6 Rather, in the 1990s and beyond, the issue was one of
international law and tax sovereignty:117
There is no rule of international law that requires nations to
conform to a single tax system. A country can have a worldwide
system, a territorial system, or a system that incorporates elements
of both. In recognition of principles of tax sovereignty, a country
using the worldwide system is free to incorporate elements of a
territorial system (or vice versa), so that a foreign subsidiary, or
particular kinds of foreign subsidiaries, such as a FSC, are taxed in
a manner similar to foreign corporations under a territorial system
(exemption of income plus an exemption for dividends) or are
taxed like a foreign branch might be taxed under a territorial
system (exemption).
The WTO never was intended (and is not well equipped) to
establish international tax norms, especially when there is such
diversity in accepted tax practices. The WTO certainly should not
penalize a country using a worldwide system for incorporating
elements of a territorial system in order to obtain comparable tax
treatment. However, that is precisely what the European
Communities is asking the Panel to do."
Contrasting the U.S. direct income tax regime of the FSC with
the EU model of direct and indirect value added tax (VAT) taxes, the
U.S. posited that indirect taxes (VAT) were refundable under the
ASCM schema, rendering a significant economic advantage to the
EU countries.' Moreover, as a defensive maneuver, the United
States attacked the EU's interpretation of the ASCM pursuant to
footnote 59:
The European Communities makes two basic arguments in support
of its claim that the FSC regime constitutes a prohibited export
subsidy in violation of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. First,
the European Communities contends that FSC tax exemption itself
115. Id. at 53.
116. Id. at 55-58.
117. Id. at 55.
118. Id.
119. See ASCM, supra note 111, at art. 1.1.
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is a prohibited export subsidy. Second, the European Communities
alleges that the FSC administrative pricing rules provide an
additional export subsidy because they allegedly decrease the tax
burden that otherwise would be imposed, presumably by allocating
too much income to the FSC. The first is an incorrect proposition
as a matter of law; the second is both legally flawed and wholly
unsupported by facts.
The United States first responds to the European Communities'
first argument - that the FSC partial tax exemption is an export
subsidy. This position is untenable, as a matter of law, because it
ignores the specific provision of the SCM Agreement that contains
the controlling legal standard applicable to its claim - Footnote 59
and the GATT subsidy principles it embodies. Footnote 59
confirms that income generated from economic activity outside the
territory of the taxing authority need not be taxed, and that a
decision not to tax such income is not a prohibited subsidy. This
principle, which dates back to the GATT's original ban on export
subsidies and which is articulated in the authoritative 1981 decision
of the GATT Council, makes clear that such a tax exemption does
not violate Article 3.1(a). The FSC was expressly designed to
exempt income derived from foreign economic activities. Because
it does so, it is entirely consistent with WTO standards and
principles.
Then the United States addressed the EU's second claim-that
FSC administrative pricing rules separately conferred a prohibited
subsidy by improperly shifting, or misallocating, income.
First, as a legal matter, the European Communities misconstrues
the governing provision of the SCM Agreement and builds its
entire argument on that erroneous premise. Footnote 59, the
applicable provision of the SCM Agreement, provides that WTO
Members may allocate income from export transactions in order to
distinguish income derived from economic activities outside their
territory from income derived from economic activities within their
territory. Footnote 59 clearly provides that in making such
allocations, Members are free to use administrative or other
practices. Accordingly, Members have considerable discretion in
deciding what administrative practices to apply, so long as the
overall allocation of income approximates arm's length results and
does not result in a "significant saving" of direct taxes in export
transactions.
The European Communities misstates this standard and, instead,
assumes that a prohibited subsidy exists, by definition, because the
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FSC does not perform enough activities itself to earn the income
allocated to it under the administrative pricing rules, or because the
use of an administrative pricing rule may, in particular transactions,
produce results different from the result that Section 482 might
yield in the same transaction. This ipso facto argument ignores the
fact that the purpose of footnote 59 is to discipline the allocation of
income so as not to overstate income attributable to foreign
economic activities, and thereby confer a subsidy by exempting
income generated from activities occurring within the taxing
authority's territory. By alleging simply that in particular
transactions administrative rules yield prices that are different from
those that would result were those rules not available, the
European Communities misses both the point of footnote 59 and
the point of what the FSC provisions, including its administrative
pricing rules, are intended to do.12
Despite its efforts to demonstrate the fallacy of the arguments
posed by the EU, the Dispute Settlement Panel of the WTO decided,
inter alia, that the FSC tax regime was indeed an export subsidy in
violation of the ASCM:
In our view, the status of the FSC exemptions as an export subsidy
within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement is
confirmed by item (e) of the Illustrative List. It will be recalled that
Article 3.1(a) includes the export subsidies "illustrated in Annex I",
i.e., the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies. Under item (e) of the
Illustrative List, the following is an export subsidy:
The full or partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically
related to exports, of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid
or payable by industrial or commercial enterprises.
We consider that the FSC exemptions at issue in this dispute do
constitute the "full or partial exemption remission, or deferral... of
direct taxes.., paid or payable by industrial or commercial
enterprises." Second, the exemptions provided under the FSC
scheme are in our view "exemptions" within the meaning of item
(e) or, in the case of the exemption from the anti-deferral rules of
Subpart F, represent the "deferral" of direct taxes. Thus, the U.S.
corporate income taxes from which the FSC scheme provides
exemptions are "direct taxes" within the meaning of item (e).
We further consider that the FSC exemptions are "specifically
related to exports" within the meaning of item (e). In this respect,
120. See Panel Report supra note 96, at 63-64.
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we recall our conclusion that the FSC exemptions in question shield
from taxation "foreign trading income.
12
'
The Panel did not adopt the view espoused by the United States
that footnote 59 of Article I authorizes a Member to exempt from tax
revenue arising from foreign export transactions even if it does not
exempt from tax revenue arising from foreign economic processes
unrelated to export transactions.ln To wit:
[N]owhere, however, does footnote 59 state that "item (e) is not
intended to prevent Members from exempting from direct taxes
foreign-source income relating to export transactions". The
existence of explicit "qualifying" language in footnote 59 regarding
deferral and double taxation serves to underline the absence of any
explicit statement in respect of the principle which the United
States contends may be found in footnote 59. If the Members had
desired to exempt from the export subsidy prohibition certain
exemptions from direct taxation that were specifically related to
exports, they might have been expected to do so explicitly.2
Hence, the Panel found that the FSC tax regime was an export tax
subsidy in violation of the ASCM.'24 The Panel Report is significant,
however, for what it did not decide. No decision was made on the all-
important issue of whether the administrative pricing rules of the FSC
tax regime constituted an export subsidy by their very operation, and
whether the 50% domestic content requirement of the FSC tax
regime was also an export subsidy."z Since the entire FSC tax regime
was found to be an export subsidy in violation of the ASCM, Dispute
Panel declined to decide these issues, particularly the administrative
pricing rule 26 issue:
In light of our conclusion that FSC exemptions in their totality
represent a prohibited export subsidy, and because, in our view,
FSC administrative pricing rules perform no role and serve no
purpose outside the functioning of those exemptions, we consider
121. Id. at 278.
122. Id. at 280.
123. Id. at 280-81.
124. Id. at 287-95.
125. Id. at 296-98. At I.R.C. § 927(a)(1)(iii), "export property" is defined, inter
alia, as not more than 50% of the fair market value attributable to articles imported
into the United States. This is the so-called domestic content rule, and any violation
thereof excludes the exports from the favorable FSC tax exemption. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.927(a)-1T(e)(4)(iii)(B) and examples thereunder.
126. Panel Report, supra note 96, at 283.
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that we have discharged our duty under our terms of reference to
make such findings in respect of the European Communities'
Article 3.1(a) claims as will assist the DSB in making its
recommendations. 27
In October 1999, as a result of its findings,'" the Dispute
Settlement Panel recommended to the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body that the United States withdraw the FSC subsidies without
delay. 9 It also recommended, inter alia, that the United States bring
the FSC scheme into conformity with its obligations with respect to
export subsidies under the ASCM. ° The time frame set for
compliance with the ASCM by the United States was no later than
October 1, 2000. "'
C. WTO Appellate Report
Approximately one month after the rendering of the Panel
Report, the United States appealed to the Appellate Body of the
WTO." Such review is not de novo and is final for the parties.133
On appeal, the United States raised the following issues:
(a) [W]hether the Panel erred in finding that the FSC measure
constitutes a prohibited export subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of the
SCM Agreement, including whether the Panel erred in finding that
the FSC measure involves a "subsidy" under Article 1.1 of the SCM
Agreement;
(b) whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of
Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture, in particular:
i. in its interpretation and application of the term "costs of
marketing" in Article 9.1(d) of the Agreement on
Agriculture; and
ii. in its interpretation and application of the words "shall not
provide such subsidies" in Article 3.3 of the Agreement on
127. Id.
128. Id. at 293-94.
129. Id. at 294.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 295.
132. See B. Whiskeyman, U.S. Resubmits Appeal with WTO in Foreign Sales
Corporation Dispute, 228 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-3 (Nov. 29,1999).
133. See generally note 106, supra. Unlike common law tribunals, the Appellate
Body of the WTO is not bound by precedent. See Cunningham & Smith, supra note
107, at 587.
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Agriculture.
(c) whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of
Article 4.2 of the SCM Agreement;
(d) whether the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of
footnote 59 of the SCM Agreement by declining to dismiss or defer
the European Communities' claims regarding the FSC
administrative pricing rules until the European Communities had
attempted to resolve this matter through the facilities of existing
bilateral tax treaties or other specific international instruments;
(e) whether the Panel erred in finding that it was neither necessary
nor appropriate to make findings with respect to the European
Communities' claims under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement
relating to the FSC administrative pricing rules;
(f) whether the Panel erred in finding that it was neither necessary
nor appropriate to make findings with respect to the European
Communities' claims under Article 3.1(b) of the SCMAgreement.93
In its relatively terse opinion, the Appellate Body did not recognize
any merit to the appellant's (United States') argument that footnote
59 of Article 1.1 of the ASCM excludes tax regimes like the FSC:135
[E]ven if footnote 59 means-as the United States also argues-
that a measure, such as the FSC measure, is not a prohibited export
subsidy, footnote 59 does not purport to establish an exception to
the general definition of a "subsidy" otherwise applicable
throughout the entire SCM Agreement.
In affirming the WTO Panel Report, the Appellate Body
decided, inter alia, that:
(a) the FSC measure constitutes a prohibited export subsidy under
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement;
(d) the United States acts inconsistently with its obligations under
Articles 10.1 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture by applying
export subsidies, through the FSC measure, in a manner which
results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of its export
134. Appellate Panel Report, supra note 10, at 25.
135. Id. at 32.
136. Id.
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subsidy commitments with respect to both scheduled and
unscheduled agricultural products;
(f) it declines to examine the Panel's denial, in paragraph 7.22 of
the Panel Report, of the request by the United States that the Panel
dismiss or defer the European Communities' claims regarding the
FSC administrative pricing rules pending recourse by the European
Communities to the facilities of an appropriate tax forum;
(g) it declines to examine the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.127 of
the Panel Report, that it was neither necessary nor appropriate to
make findings with respect to the European Communities' claims
under Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement relating to the FSC
administrative pricing rules. ... 37
Thus, like its predecessor Panel Report, the WTO Appellate Report
expressly declined to decide whether the FSC tax regime
administrative pricing rules and 50% domestic content requirement
were in violation of the export subsidy rules set forth in the ASCM.
3 1
So in February 2000, the United States was faced with an ultimatum:
follow the WTO recommendations and modify its FSC tax regime to
cast it within the acceptable trade rules of the ASCM, or face trade
sanctions after failing to reach a mutually acceptable compensation
agreement with the EU members.139
From a pure tax standpoint, it was clear in the Appellate Report
that whatever the United States devised to respond to the export
subsidy charge, it had to address both reports' concerns that the FSC
tax regime resulted in a reduction of revenues "otherwise due."' 4
This is the "but for" test application in the Panel Report (and
affirmed in the Appellate Report): "but for" the FSC scheme, the
foreign trade income would not benefit from deferral." Thus, in the
absence of the FSC scheme, the U.S. parent corporation would be
required to pay taxes on dividends made out of the earnings and
profits attributable to the FSC's foreign trade income.4 This point
137. Id. at 59-60.
138. Id. See also Stanley I. Langbein, International Decision: United States - Tax
Treatmentfor "Foreign Sales Corporations," 94 AM. J. INT'L. L. 546 (2000).
139. See Settling Disputes, supra note 105, at 6.
140. See Panel Report, supra note 96, at 275.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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was conceded by the United States.'
It appeared, therefore, that to reach a viable solution the United
States had to address the "but for" test within the context of the FSC
tax regime granting a subsidy levied as a direct (versus indirect) tax
and the benefit bestowed on exports.'TM After a collaborative effort,'45
the United States advanced a proposal to the WTO on May 2, 2000,
which was as radical as it was creative. In essence, it had to develop a
trade-off tax regime that balanced the trade benefits displaced by the
defunct FSC regime against compliance with the WTO Panel Report.
That proposal was the new Eligible Foreign Corporation"' which, as
will be seen, failed to satisfy the WTO.
IH. The FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion
Act of 2000
A. Abortive Efforts: The Eligible Foreign Corporation
Some few months after the WTO found the FSC tax regime to be
an export subsidy in violation of the ASCM, the United States
proposed a repeal of the FSC legislation and creation of an eligible
foreign corporation (EFC)."7  The EFC had its debilities. It
preserved the 50% domestic content requirement and the special
administrative pricing rules (now referred to as "formulary pricing")
of the FSC regime." All manufacturing income of U.S. corporations
143. Id.
144. See note 138 supra.
145. Numerous private sector companies sought to offer proposals and
alternatives. See, e.g., Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means,
Hearing on Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International Competitiveness, 105th Cong.
1st Sess. (1999) (statement of Sally A. Stiles, International Tax Manager, Caterpillar
Inc.), available at 1999 WL 458249 [hereinafter Stiles]; see also Testimony Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing on Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on
International Competitiveness, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. (1999) (statement of Kevin
Conway, Vice President, Taxes, United Technologies Corp. and Vice Chairman,
International Tax Subcommittee, National Association of Manufacturers), available
at 1999 WL 458271 [hereinafter Conway].
146. See FDTA Hot Issues: U.S. Proposes FSC Replacement Legislation, at 1
(May 2, 2000), at http://www.fdta-cite.org/hot.
147. Id.
148. See FDTA Hot Issues: EU Cries "Foul" over the U.S. FSC Alternative Tax
Proposal, at 1 (May 26, 2000), at http://www.fdta-cite.org/hot.
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was subject to the reduced marginal tax rate of 29%.' But unlike the
FSC regime, the U.S. parent could elect to treat all entities, foreign
and domestic (including controlled foreign corporations), as an EFC,
subjecting its earnings to the preferential rate.' Hence, it was an
elective tax regime proposal that applied across the board to export
and non-export sales.'
Unfortunately, the Chairman of the EU Commission found the
proposed EFC regime to be defective 2 because, like its predecessor
the FSC, it still owed allegiance to export sales," maintained the
domestic content requirement,"M and permitted formulary pricing.'55
The EU Chairman was ostensibly correct, 6 but the United States was
still saddled with a fast approaching October 1, 2000 deadline.
Moreover, a lame duck President was in the White House, who would
be exiting within months of the EU rejection. The last thing
President Clinton wanted for his international legacy was to be
identified in history as the President who started a trade war with
America's European neighbors."
Finally, on July 27, 2000, the Joint Committee on Taxation
presented the House Ways and Means Committee with a bill by that
employed an entirely different approach than the failed EFC
proposal.' It passed the same day.'59 Such was the birth of H.R.
4986.
149. See Stiles, supra note 145, at 1.
150. Id.
151. See Joe Kirwin, Sindhu G. Hirani & Katherine M. Stimmel, U.S. Outlines
FSC Fix to Europeans, Offers Elective Regime for Foreign Sales, 86 Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), at GG-1 (May 3,2000).
152. See FDTA Hot Issues, supra note 146, at 1.
153. See Stiles, supra note 145, at 1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Joe Kirwin & Daniel Pruzin, Europeans, U.S. Officials to Face Off
Following EU Rejection of FSC Proposal, 105 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at GG-1 (May
31,2000).
157. The interaction of the White House and the House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman indicates the level of commitment by the White House and
Congress on this point. See, e.g., Ryan J. Donmoyer, "Don't Give Away FSC Store,"
Archer Cautions White House, TAX NoTEs TODAY, March 22, 2000, available at 2000
TNT 56-4.
158. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 4986 (FSC Repeal and
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000), July 27,2000.
159. See Sindhu G. Hirani, Ways, Means Oks Proposal to Replace FSC with More
Territorial Taxation System, 146 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at GG-1 (July 28,2000).
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B. The FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of
2000 (H.R. 4986)
The clock was ticking. After its passage by the Committee on
Ways and Means on July 27, 2000, H.R. 4986 had to wind its way
through the Senate Finance Committee, the Joint Conference
Committee, House and Senate Floor votes, and the White House-all
before the October 1, 2000 deadline. This would be a challenge of no
small measure considering the proposed legislation's new "territorial"
approach;"W broadened availability to most U.S. taxpayers (U.S.
individuals, domestic C or S corporations, partnerships, branches and
other flow-through entities); 1 retention of the 50% domestic content
requirement and formulary pricing;162 the lack of foreign corporation,
foreign office or foreign management requirements;"63 and the
dividends-received deduction on qualified foreign trade income."6
In light of the Ways and Means Committee recommendations,' 6'
the House passed H.R. 4986 on September 13, 2000. Just six days
later, however, the Senate Finance Committee reported out a version
that differed slightly from H.R. 4986.'66 Nevertheless, with the
deadline looming, the EU and the United States reached an accord to
extend the October 1, 2000 deadline (to avoid trade sanctions) until
November 1, 2000,167 which was subsequently extended to November
17, 2000.16 The Senate eventually passed the amended version, which
disallowed the dividends-received deduction, on November 1, 2000,
and sent it to the House, which subsequently passed the bill on
November 14, 2000.169 Finally, just two days before the extended
160. See FDTA Hot Issues: Executive Briefing, at 2, 3 (July 28, 2000), at
http://www.fdta.cite.org/hot. See also FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act of 2000, supra note 158.
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, supra
note 158, at 5-6.
165. See Hirani, supra note 159.
166. See Robert Goulder, Senators Urge Consent Agreement for FSC Repeal Bill,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, Sept. 25,2000, at 3, available at 2000 TNT 186-3.
167. See Cordia Scott, FSC Extension Shows EU's Willingness to Solve Dispute,
TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 10, 2000, available at 2000 TNT 196-3; Senate Presses for
Export Tax Overhaul, Oct. 4,2000, at http://wwww.news.lycos.com.
168. See Daniel Pruzin, EU Sets Nov. 17 Date for Retaliation Request If U.S. Fails
to Adopt FSC Replacement, 212 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-1 (Nov. 1, 2000).
169. See 213 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at GG-1, L-1, L-7 (Nov. 2, 2000) for the
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deadline expired, President Clinton signed H.R. 4986 into law and on
November 15, 2000, an international trade war was narrowly
averted."' At the signing ceremony President Clinton stated:
particularly legislation in the sensitive field of taxation policy, in
order to implement the findings of a dispute settlement panel of the
WTO. We believe that this legislation specifically addresses the
concerns raised by the WTO Appellate Body and will be found to
be WTO-compliant.
17 1
Thus, H.R. 4986, now P.L. 106-519, became the new tax regime
creating a unique treatment for export sales. But would it pass the
gauntlet of the EU, the WTO recommendations, and the ASCM?
This important piece of legislation bears scrutiny to answer this
query.
C. The FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of
2000 (P.L. 106-519)
The alacrity with which the major tax legislation moved through
Congress and the White House was mind-boggling."r But, as the
adage queries, does haste make waste? Within a month of passage,
the EU renewed its request for authority to impose sanctions
amounting to over $4 billion annually.'r  Pursuant to WTO
procedures, the EU and the United States held consultations on P.L.
106-519. The consultations failed,7 4 and the EU requested the
establishment of a WTO compliance panel to assess whether the new
legislation was WTO consistent. " 5 Coterminous with the panel's
appointment was the suspension of the $4 billion trade sanctions until
Senate vote and 221 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at GG-1, GG-2, GG-3 (Nov. 15, 2000)
for the House vote.
170. See FSCS: Clinton Signs Bill Replacing FSC Regime 223 Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), at GG-1 (Nov. 17,2000). It applies to transactions after September 30,2000,
but allows for FSCs in existence prior to that date to continue to operate for all
transactions entered into before January 1, 2002 and all transactions under a binding
contract in effect on September 30,2000. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 941(5)(c).
171. Id.
172. When one considers that the original H.R. 4986 was tendered by the Joint
Committee on Taxation in late July, 2000, and a final comprehensive piece of tax
legislation repealing seven Code sections and substituting an entirely new
international tax regime was enacted in early November, 2000, it is quite remarkable.
173. See Talisman, supra note 12, at 5.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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resolution.'76 If the compliance panel finds the FSC replacement
legislation to be WTO consistent, the matter ends.'77 On the other
hand, if it is found to be WTO inconsistent, then the $4 billion trade
sanctions may become operative subject to a WTO arbitration
panel.78 The Treasury Department is confident that P.L. 106-519 is
neither an export subsidy nor export contingent .
To determine whether this is the case, P.L. 106-519 must be
examined. It contains, inter alia, the following measures:
" Repeal of I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (the FSC provisions);'8"
* Special exclusion for extraterritorial income;'
* Election process applicable to a broader category of U.S.
persons;182
* Special definitions for qualified foreign trading income8" and
property,"84 foreign trading gross receipts' 85 and foreign
trading sale and leasing income;' 86
* Neither credits nor deductions (including the dividends
received deduction) are allowed;'8
o Certain FSC provisions are retained; to wit: domestic content
requirement,' formulary pricing,'8" and economic process
requirements;'"6 and
o Liberal treatment of existing FSCs with respect to
compliance via the transitional rules.'
The preceding seven measures bear closer scrutiny to determine
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 26 U.S.C.A. prec. § 921(2).
181. Id. § 114.
182. Id. § 943(e).
183. Id. § 941.
184. Id. § 943(a).
185. Id. § 942(a).
186. Id. § 941(c).
187. Id. § 114 (c), (d).
188. Id. § 943(a)(1)(C).
189. Id. § 941(a)(1)(A), (B), (C).
190. Id. § 942(b).
191. Id. § 941(5)(c).
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whether the export subsidy label adheres. First, of the significant
features of the new legislation, the one most satisfying to the EU, and
thus judged WTO compliant, is the provision dealing with the repeal
of the FSC §§ 921-927." Clearly the mandate from the WTO Panel
Report,193 as affirmed in the WTO Appellate Report,'" was that such
a tax regime was an export subsidy and noncompliant with the
ASCM.
Second is the measure creating a special exclusion for
extraterritorial income.9 In drafting an entirely new § 114, Treasury
created a new benchmark for taxing income from sales outside the
United States by providing that gross income specifically excludes
extraterritorial income, provided such income is "qualifying foreign
trade income."' 96 Consistent with that treatment, as discussed below,
no "double dipping" is allowed, i.e., no deductions or credits are
permitted against such repatriated and distributed income." Of
greater significance, however, is that the exclusion under new § 114
applies to both the regular tax and the alternative minimum tax91 for
the affected U.S. taxpayer."
Third is the election process. To receive the exclusion a single
entity approach2 is employed unlike the FSC regime, which
mandated that a separate affiliate be used for the exclusion. It is also
more inclusive in that the exclusion is available to more U.S.
taxpayers, i.e., individuals, domestic C or S corporations,
partnerships, branches and other conduit or flow-through entities."
1
192. See 26 U.S.C.A. prec. § 921(2).
193. See Panel Report, supra note 96, at 294.
194. See Appellate Panel Report, supra note 10, at 59-60.
195. See 26 U.S.C.A. prec. § 114.
196. Id. § 114(a), (e).
197. Id. § 114(c), (d).
198. See, e.g., supra note 158, at 5. The individual and corporate alternative
minimum tax can be particularly onerous because it can place taxpayers in the
position of a substantial tax liability despite the fact that little or no regular tax
liability occurs. To review how this process works, see HAROLD S. PECKRON,
PLANNING AND WORKING WITH E ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAx pts. I, I, IV (1991
Supp.).
199. See 26 U.S.C.A. prec. § 114(a), (e).
200. This approach substantially mitigates the EU's argument under the FSC tax
regime, though never decided by the WTO trial or appellate panels, that the transfer
pricing or administrative pricing rules were a form of subsidy. Here it is theoretically
impossible to "allocate" income when only a single entity is involved. See notes 82
and 99, supra.
201. See supra note 158, at 5.
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Even shared entities are permitted, as is the case with shared
partnerships.' Hence, the exclusion principle of new § 114 and the
election process by a single entity to treat qualifying foreign trade
income as excludable income addresses the WTO concern that there
is no foregone (deferred) revenue' and thus, no subsidy.
This is buttressed by the nature of the election. Even certain
foreign corporations, e.g., former FSCs or controlled foreign
corporations, may elect to be treated as domestic corporations,0 4
provided the electing corporation foregoes any U.S. treaty
concessions and either manufactures property in the ordinary course
of its business or substantially all of its gross receipts are foreign
trading gross receipts.' Such election, once terminated or revoked,
cannot be made again for up to five years.' Consequently, the
second and third provisions should be viewed as WTO compliant and
acceptable to the EU.
Fourth are the special definition sections of qualified foreign
trading income and property, foreign trading gross receipts, and
foreign trading sale and leasing income.20 If there is an Achilles heel
in the new legislation for WTO compliance, this may be it. How
narrowly the specific terms are defined may be the determining factor
for the WTO compliance panel.'
In order to qualify for the blanket exclusion, a U.S. taxpayer
must have qualifying foreign trade income,' which is the umbrella
term to include foreign trading gross receipts,2  foreign trade
income,21' and foreign sale and leasing income.212 Qualifying foreign
trade income is the amount of the taxpayer's gross income that, if
excluded pursuant to new § 114, would result in a reduction of taxable
income by the greatest of:
A. 30% of the foreign sale and leasing income derived by the
taxpayer from such transaction,
202. 26 U.S.C.A. § 943(0.
203. See supra note 121.
204. 26 U.S.C.A. § 943(e).
205. Id. at § (e)(2).
206. Id. at § (e)(3)(C).
207. See 26 U.S.C.A. prec. §§ 941,941(a), 942(a), 943(a).
208. See generally, Talisman, supra note 12.
209. See 26 U.S.C.A. prec. § 941.
210. See supra note 185.
211. See supra note 183.
212. See supra note 186.
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B. 1.2% of the foreign trading gross receipts derived by the
taxpayer from the transaction, or
C. 15% of the foreign trade income derived by the taxpayer
from the transaction.213
Note that these three rules are equivalent to the "hexed"
administrative pricing rules condemned by the EU214 (albeit the WTO
Panels did not decide whether such rules were a species of the export
subsidy).
Would the adoption of the FSC tax regime's administrative
pricing rules be the death knell for the new legislation? Perhaps not.
The strenuous objection by the EU went to the allocation preference
accorded the income between the FSC and the U.S. corporation."5
Such is not the case here with a single entity. The only purpose these
formulary rules obtain is to allow income allocations within the single
entity-a purpose that should be far less objectionable to the EU.
At the heart of the qualifying foreign trade income is the
definition of foreign trade income,116 which means the taxable income
of the taxpayer attributable to foreign trading gross receipts of the
taxpayer.217 Hence, the crucial definition becomes foreign trading
gross receipts,218 which turns upon the classification of the source of
such receipts, viz., qualifying foreign trading property.l 9 To wit:
(1) In General,--the term 'qualifying foreign trade property' means
property -
A. manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted within or
outside the United States,
B. held primarily for sale, lease, or rental, in the ordinary
course of trade or business for direct use, consumption, or
disposition outside the United States, and
C. not more than 50% of the fair market value of which is
attributable to -
i. articles manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted
213. 26 U.S.C.A. § 941(a)(1)(A), (B), (C).
214. See supra notes 94, 95 and 96.
215. See supra note 115.
216. 26 U.S.C.A. § 941(b).
217. Id. at § (b)(1).
218. See supra note 185.
219. See supra note 184.
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outside the United States, and
ii. direct costs for labor (determined under the principles
of section 263A) performed outside the United
States.m
Once again, the 50% domestic content requirement of the FSC
tax regime is preserved under this definition but it is modified to
allow manufacture to include outside the United States, provided the
50% threshold is maintained. This could be a point of resistance with
the EU countries but, if viewed in the larger vista of world trade,
should be permissible. As with the administrative pricing rules, the
WTO trial and appellate bodies declined to decide whether the
domestic content requirement was tantamount to an export subsidy."
Arguably the "foreign economic processes" support the finding
that foreign trading gross receipts can originate only from certain
economic processes outside the United States.' The saving grace is
that there is no longer a requirement that production must be in the
United States. Thus, 100% of the production can be overseas, as in
foreign direct investment casestm provided that the 50% domestic
content requirement is satisfied in those foreign-made goods.224
Another concern is whether the foreign sale and leasing income,
which generates foreign trade income, is similar, like foreign trading
gross receipts, to the criteria necessary for the FSC regime.' Foreign
sale and leasing income is the amount of the taxpayer's foreign trade
income that is allocated to activities constituting foreign economic
processes or income from the leasing of qualifying foreign trade
property.'
As for this fourth measure, the EU disgust with the FSC tax
220. 26 U.S.C.A. § 943(a)(1).
221. See Langbein, supra note 138.
222. 26 U.S.C.A § 942(b).
223. Foreign direct investments exhibit greater complexity and risk than domestic
ventures; yet, such investments actually lower the portfolio risk of the U.S. taxpayer
by stabilizing the combined operating cash flows for the U.S. multinational
corporation. This risk reduction occurs because the two economies, foreign and
domestic, have less than perfect correlation. See STANLEY B. BLOCK & GEOFFREY A.
HIRT, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 593 (8th ed. 1997).
224. 26 U.S.C.A. § 943(a)(1)(C). An elective American manufacturer in Belgium
that uses at least 50% American parts to manufacture and assemble a product that is
sold in Europe is an example of this rule.
225. See supra note 158, at 6.
226. 26 U.S.C.A. § 941 (c), (1), (2).
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regime on foreign sales should not extend to the new legislation
because the definitional treatment of foreign sales is consistent with
the WTO decision, meaning that a U.S. taxpayer obtains the same tax
benefit on foreign sales regardless of their point of manufacture,
whether in the United States or overseas.2 7 Such consistency should
appease the EU since the foreign sales are not export contingent and
should be found ASCM consistent by the WTO compliance panel.
Fifth is that neither tax credits nor tax deductions are allowed
under the new legislation.' Unlike the FSC regime, no dividends-
received deduction is allowed to the U.S. corporation.' This
treatment should present no problem to the EU since it resolves a
bone of contention under the FSC tax regime.30
Sixth, as discussed earlier, the retention of the 50% domestic
content rule (mitigated by the carte blanche overseas production
rule), formulary pricing (negated by the single entity requirement),
and the economic processes requirement (relaxed by the overseas
production rule) should be considered far less objectionable to the
EU as they cure FSC deficiencies. Such treatments appear consistent
with the letter and spirit of Article 3.1 and particularly footnote 59 of
the ASCM in describing an export subsidy."'
Last is the recognition that the retroactive effective date' of the
legislation, after September 30, 2000, could adversely impact U.S.
taxpayers with existing FSCs. So, transition rules had to be adopted
that recognized this fact. In the instant case, these rules can only be
characterized as rather liberal* 3 Thus, any FSC in existence before
September 30, 2000, could continue as an FSC for any transactions
arising before January 1, 2002' and all transactions arising from a
binding agreement in effect on September 30, 2000.' s Also U.S.
227. See 26 U.S.C.A. prec. §§ 941,942(a), 943(a).
228. Id. § 114(c), (d).
229. This was the so-called Grassley amendment to H.R. 4986, which specifically
denied the dividends received deduction to U.S. corporations on qualifying foreign
trade income. See Senators Urge Consent Agreement for FSC Repeal Bill, Sept. 25,
2000, available at 2000 TNT 186-3.
230. See Panel Report, supra note 96, at 47-48.
231. Id. at 280.
232. The bill (H.R. 4986) was signed into law on November 15, 2000, but was
retroactively effective on transactions occurring after September 30, 2000, to comply
with the original WTO deadline of October 1, 2000.
233. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 941(5)(c).
234. Id. § 941(c)(1)(A).
235. Id. § 941(c)(1)(B).
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taxpayers with existing FSCs can always elect to have the new
legislation apply."s These provisions would be construed as mere
administrative matters and should not strike at the heart of the
compliance issue for the WTO. 237
When all seven measures in the new legislation are considered, it
appears that none, standing alone, would be sufficient to derail this
most recent effort to comply with the WTO recommendations. Since
the EU has indicated its unwillingness to accept this effort by
requesting a WTO compliance panelns after consultations proved
fruitless, the outcome bears watching. But what tax policy
implications arise from this new approach at extraterritorial taxation?
Some undaunting challenges to international tax policy appear to
surface.
IV. International Tax Policy Implications
Tax policy is the government's attitude, objectives and actions
which reflect normative standards that the government deems most
important."m  Public Law 106-519, the new tax regime of
extraterritorial exclusion of qualifying foreign trade income by U.S.
persons, represents a major watershed in international tax policy.
This is because of the dramatic shift that it draws from the taxation of
worldwide income to the taxation of income within a discretely
defined territorial region.' Thus, taxation has long been a worldwide
concept in the United States including all income from whatever
source derived,24' at least until the prodigious step of the new
legislation. And yet, limitations242 to the general rule clearly abound,
as with nonresident alien individuals.
Territorial taxation, as espoused by P.L. 106-519, ignores the
taxpayer deriving the income and instead focuses on income solely
within a governmental territory. In essence, foreign income of a
236. Id. § 941(c)(2).
237. See Settling Disputes, supra note 105.
238. See Talisman, supra note 12.
239. See SALLY M. JONES, PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION FOR BUSINESS AND
INVESTMENT PLANNING 2000, at 23 (1999).
240. See supra note 158, at 5.
241. See I.R.C. § 1 (individual) and § 11 (corporation) for the imposition of a
direct income tax on which taxable income is the base and is derived from gross
income, and I.R.C. § 61, which expressly includes all income from whatever source
derived.
242. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2(d), 871, 877, 911(a).
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citizen or tax "person" (individual or entity) is ignored. Thus the
extraterritorial income exclusion set forth in the new law is territorial
taxation for U.S. persons.243
Another significant policy issue springing forth from the new law
is the fact that the U.S. person is an actual taxpaying entity, not a
completely artificial entity with no independent business raison d'tre
as in the FSC regime.' 44 Now corporations will use an operational
entity that has foreign trade income from foreign gross receipts of
foreign trade property. Such a policy shift supports the argument that
the new extraterritorial exclusion regime is WTO compliant.
Policy also recognizes that a legitimate tax objective for
government is the simplification of tax administration. Thus, the new
exclusion significantly reduces the administrative costs attendant to
the complexity of qualifying foreign trade income reporting.24 U.S.
taxpayers reap a benefit in lower compliance costs through
elimination of the alternative minimum tax on such income.246
These policy issues have taken international or worldwide
taxation to a new level for U.S. taxpayers. Notwithstanding the WTO
compliance panel review, it is clear that the existing extraterritorial
exclusion for qualifying foreign trade income will be long recognized
as a major contribution to U.S. tax policy.
V. Conclusion
It is interesting to reflect on the aftermath of what appeared to
be the avoidance of a trade war. Certainly the uniform trade rules of
GATT, ASCM and other procedures were followed, but what of the
strategic result? There's the rub.
Never in its history has the WTO (or its predecessor GATIT)
dissected a national tax policy on behalf of a protesting trade
member.47 While WTO procedures do not recognize precedent,2" it
is dangerous nevertheless for the WTO to embark upon such a
course. Any member nation fearful of its tax regime being attacked-
for purely political motives-will be less inclined to disclose its true
243. See note 240, supra.
244. See I.R.C. §§ 921-927.
245. The use of two entities and concomitant transfer pricing rules engenders
significant administrative cost and accounting burdens. See notes 63 and 93, supra.
246. See note 198, supra.
247. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 28.
248. See note 133, supra.
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tax policies. This, in turn, will lead to misunderstandings and further
conflicts, underscoring Justice Brandeis' comment at the beginning of
this article.
The purpose of this Article was to examine the FSC tax regime
as a catalyst to an international trade war.249 In that regard, the
history of international tax policy from 1971 to the present was
examined with particular emphasis on the most recent addition to
that repertoire, the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income
Exclusion Act of 2000. Its operative provisions were then examined
with an eye toward their compliance with the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measuresl of the WTO.
One conclusion arising from this analysis is that the new tax
policy enunciated in this law should be WTO compliant while at the
same time bringing the United States international tax regimes closer
to territorial taxation. 2 Only time will tell whether such a major
development is a strategic benefit to U.S. taxpayers. But one thing is
clear. The exercise of the WTO's judicial discretion in condemning a
country's tax regime casts the world community into a position of less,
not more, trust and openness on tax policy issues. Perhaps the sage
wisdom of a Justice Brandeis will prevail in future export cases at the
WTO. If not, the next trade war may indeed be an international
economic war.
249. See U.S. Will Challenge EU's Filing of Sanctions in FSC Dispute; No
Immediate Trade War Looms, Nov. 20,2000, available at 2000 Tax Day, No. T.1.
250. FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 (2000).
251. See note 111, supra.
252. See note 241, supra.
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